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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on some of the macroeconomic risks that lie ahead for 
Latin America. The discussion is informed by my work on crises and capital flows 
and their macroeconomic consequences. The trends and initial conditions that 
allowed the region to weather the global economic storm of 2008-2009 are 
discussed, as is the subsequent reversal of some of those benign trends.  I review the 
historical patterns connecting large capital inflow surges, or “capital flow 
bonanzas,” with the likelihood of a variety of crises—banking, currency, external 
default and inflation. For Latin America, in particular, large capital flow bonanzas 
have seldom ended well.  The implications for inflation of importing (via less than 
fully flexible exchange rates) the expansionary policy of the “North” are discussed. 
 
 
 
 
JEL: E31, F3, G01, N16, N26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This note is based on a talk titled Goodbye Inflation Targeting, Hello Fear of Floating? It was 
presented at Yale University, April 4-5, 2013 at a conference organized by Ernesto Zedillo in 
honor of the late Carlos Diaz Alejandro, Latin America: Taking Off or Still Falling Behind . The 
title of the paper is inspired by Diaz Alejandro’s classic 1985 paper “Goodbye Financial 
Repression, Hello Financial Crash.” 
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Introduction 
This time really was different.  Latin America, which is notorious for 
volatility and crises, successfully weathered the perfect storm of a worldwide 
recession. That is not to say that there were no setbacks: almost every country in the 
world, except for Japan and Switzerland, experienced some form of a currency crash 
in the fall of 2008 and early 2009.  Nearly all countries saw output and exports 
contract and in numerous cases collapse. But Latin American adroitly handled this 
crisis and avoided a repeat of the Great Depression.1  Instead of following the 
Global North into a deep recession and financial crisis, the Global South largely was 
able to maintain relatively robust levels of economic growth.  Coping well with an 
external crisis, however, does not imply that the region has become impervious to 
old risks in their many guises.  In fact, after years of a capital flow bonanza and 
importing the loose monetary policy of the North, a number of countries in Latin 
America may be “ripe” for a crisis of their own or if not an outright crisis a serious 
hard landing. In this paper, I will focus on some of those macroeconomic risks.  
The trends and initial conditions that allowed Latin America to weather the 
global economic storm of 2008-2009 are discussed in Section II while Section III,  
examines the historical patterns connecting large capital inflow surges, or “capital 
flow bonanzas,” with the likelihood of a variety of crises—banking, currency, 
external default and inflation. This section draws extensively on Reinhart and 
Reinhart (2009). For Latin America, in particular, large capital flow bonanzas rarely 
end well.  Section IV focuses on the reversal of some of the benign trends that kept 
the region out of trouble during 2008-2009 and the inflationary implications of 
                                                 
1 For a contrast to the 1930s and 1980s, see Diaz Alejandro (1983) and (1984). 
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importing (via less than fully flexible exchange rates) the expansionary policy of the 
“North.”  The concluding remarks stress the importance for policymakers of 
becoming increasingly watchful during a potentially risky turning point. 
 
II. Latin America at the Outset of the Global Crisis 
 
 
In contrast to previous periods of global economic turmoil, Latin America was 
remarkably well positioned to weather the headwinds of the Great Recession. 
Nowhere was this better seen than in a comparison of global external debt figures. 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, Latin America had among the lowest levels of external 
debt in the world during the six years preceding the financial crisis. Not only that, 
but Latin America was deleveraging at an extraordinary fast pace, resulting in debt 
levels the rivaled those of the early 1970s, among the brightest periods of Latin 
American economic growth.  
Figure1 (from Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010) is based on 2003-2009 gross 
external debt as a percent of GDP.  The left hand panel of the figure indicates 
whether there has been an increase in indebtedness to GDP over the 2003-2009 
period, or a decrease (deleveraging).   The right hand panel gives the ratio of gross 
external debt to GDP as of the end of the second quarter of 2009. The group 
averages are based on a total data set of 59 countries.   
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Figure 1.Gross External Debt as a Percent of GDP: Averages for Selected 59 
Countries, 2003-2009 
(in percent) 
 
Sources:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook , World, Bank, Quarterly External 
Debt Statistics (QEDS), and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  Data for 2009 end in the second quarter.  The countries participating in QEDS included in 
these calculations are listed in what follows by region. Advanced-Europe:   Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, (15 countries). If Ireland were included, the averages would be 
substantially higher for this group;  Emerging Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey, (11 countries). 
Former Soviet Union: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, 
and the Ukraine (8 countries). Africa: Egypt, South Africa, and Tunisia (3 countries).  Asia-
Emerging: Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand (6 countries). Latin America:  
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,  El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, and Uruguay (12 countries). There are a total of 19 advanced economies and 40 emerging 
markets. 
 
  As the right hand side of the figure illustrates, external debt burdens at the 
time of the crisis were particularly high in Europe, with an average external debt to 
GDP ratio across advanced European economies of over 200 percent, and an average 
external debt to GDP across emerging European economies roughly 100 percent.  A 
sizable share of the debt is intra-European, but nonetheless external to the country.  
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Famously profligate Latin America, by contrast to the advanced economies, at 
the time of the global crisis had gross external debt liabilities averaging only around 
50 percent of GDP.   Moreover, in contrast to the advanced countries who added an 
average of 50 percent of GDP to gross external debt during the recent period, Latin 
American countries actually reduced external debt by more than 30 percent of GDP.  
 Importantly, Latin America lowered its foreign currency liabilities and shifted 
away from dollarized to domestic-denominated debt, avoiding one of the major 
pitfalls of emerging market borrowing. Additionally, current accounts for most of 
the region were in surplus, a relative rarity for the region. Indeed, domestic 
conditions in Latin America were so strong that one could not find a newspaper in 
the fall of 2008 and in 2009 that ran an article about the possibility of default in 
Latin America as a result of the global economic meltdown--itself a rarity. 
 This sharp deleveraging in the run-up to 2008-2009 is intimately connected 
with the drought in capital inflows to the region for several years. The first blow to 
inflows after their surge post-Brady Plan restructuring in late 1980s early 1990s 
came from the Mexican crisis of late 1994.2 The second downturn came during the 
latter stages of the Asian crisis and the outbreak of the Russian crisis in the fall of 
1998—this was followed by the collapse of the Real Inflation Stabilization Plan in 
Brazil in early 1999; the final nail in the coffin of a capital flow reversal or Calvo-
style sudden stop came in end 2001 with the Argentine default and its consequences 
for Uruguay (which culminated in a debt restructuring in 2003).3 The drought would 
become a torrential downpour subsequently. 
                                                 
22 See, for instance, Calvo and Mendoza (1996). 
3 For the original sudden stop concept see Calvo (1998). 
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III. Capital Inflow Bonanzas and Their Risks 
 In this section we describe some of the global factors that gave rise to one of 
the longest (if not the longest) capital flow bonanza episodes on record in the region. 
We later turn to focus to their attendant risks. 
The North 
 More than five years after the crisis, the advanced economies are struggling 
with a public and private a debt overhang of historic proportions. The deleveraging 
process is still in its early stages in the Global North (especially in Europe), and 
efforts to tackle deficits have been hindered by chronic unemployment, and tepid 
growth. Because of the combination of high debt and low growth, some periphery 
countries in Europe are in dire need of debt restructuring, a problem that is unlikely 
to end with Greece and Cyprus. 
 The monetary policy response in the North has been to bring policy interest 
rates to levels that are at or near zero, a reasonable response to the fragility of the 
financial systems and the prolonged weakness in these economies. As a result, real 
interest rates have been extremely low and often negative. Figure 2 (from Reinhart 
and Sbrancia, 2011) shows a frequency distribution of real interest rates on 
government bonds in 22 advanced economies.  
During the era of financial repression, capital controls, interest rate ceilings 
(1945-1980), nearly 47 percent of countries had interest rates at or below zero 
percent. 4After 1980, the advanced economies began to liberalize their financial 
                                                 
4 Financial repression includes directed lending to the government by captive domestic audiences 
(such as pension funds or domestic banks), explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, regulation of 
cross-border capital movements, and (generally) a tighter connection between government and 
banks, either explicitly through public ownership of some of the banks or through heavy “moral 
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markets, and between 1980 and 2007, real interest rates rose dramatically and the 
number of countries with interest rates at or below zero percent fell to 10.5 percent. 
Since the crisis in 2008, advanced economies have witnessed a return of financial 
repression, which has had a disproportionate impact on real interest rates. Between 
2008 and 2011, it was extremely hard to find real interest rates above 2 percent 
anywhere in the developed world—in effect, as shown in the inset to Figure 2, less 
than three percent of the observations fall into the above two percent category. 
Figure 2: Real Interest Rates Frequency Distribution:  
Advanced Economies 1945-2011 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics , Reinhart and Sbrancia 
(2011). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
suasion”.  Financial repression is also sometimes associated with relatively high reserve 
requirements (or liquidity requirements), securities transaction taxes, prohibition of gold purchases 
(as in the US from 1933 to 1974), or the placement of significant amounts of government debt that 
is nonmarketable. 
In the current policy discussion, financial repression issues come under the broad umbrella of 
“macroprudential regulation.”   
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At the same time, real interest rates were low or negative, commodity prices 
remained relatively high. This combination made many Latin American economies 
(and other emerging markets) comparatively attractive investments. The result has 
been a huge inflow of capital into the region. 
Defining a capital flow bonanza: A summary of Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) 
Capital flow bonanzas rarely end well. As Mendoza and Terrones (2012) 
summarized in their paper on credit booms, “not every credit boom ends in crisis, 
but every crisis has been preceded by a credit boom.” One could say the exact same 
thing about capital flow bonanzas. 
 Here we summarize the Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) –henceforth RR--
approach to dating a capital flow bonanza. An inflow bonanza can end with a bang 
or with a whimper.  In this sense, the approach parallels the analysis of Goldfajn and 
Valdes (1999), who rather than starting their analysis with currency crises dates, 
began by documenting episodes of cumulative real exchange rate appreciations of 
varying degrees and then sorted out which episodes unwound through an abrupt 
nominal exchange rate crash and which did so through reductions in inflation versus 
their trading partners.  
 The current account balance as a percent of GDP is the benchmark indicator, 
as it is measured more consistently across time and international boundaries than its 
capital account and financial account counterpart. 5 The preferred RR algorithm 
provided uniform treatment across countries but was flexible enough to allow for 
significant cross-country variation in the current account.  As in Kaminsky and 
                                                 
5 For the more recent period, the same filter rules are applied to the capital and financial account 
balances as a robustness check. 
8 
 
Reinhart (1999), RR select a threshold to define bonanzas that is common across 
countries (in this case the 20th percentile).  This threshold included most of the 
better known episodes in the literature but was not so inclusive as to label a bonanza 
more “routine” deteriorations in the current account.  Because the underlying 
frequency distributions vary widely across countries, the common threshold 
produces quite disperse country-specific cutoffs.   
Do capital flow bonanzas make countries more crisis prone? 
 Are capital flow bonanzas a blessing or a curse?  Or, for that matter, are they 
neutral as regards their role in making financial crises more likely or more severe?  
The literature is filled with famous case studies of capital flow bonanzas that ended 
in spectacular crises. The papers range from the infamous episodes in the Southern 
Cone in the late 1970s-early 1980s  (see, for instance, Diaz Alejandro’s 1985 
classic) to Calvo and Talvi (2005), who place great store in the capital flow sudden 
stop following the Russian 1998 crisis in explaining Argentina’s subsequent crash.  
Rather than focusing on specific episodes that are either as famous or more obscure, 
in this section we systematically examine the potential links between the likelihood 
of a capital inflow bonanza and financial crises.   Our analysis is conducted on a 
country-by-country basis as well as at the “global” level consistent with the aim of 
providing an encompassing approach.  RR’s comprehensive database on the dates of 
bonanza and crises episodes allows us to uncover novel results on the systematic 
connection between the incidence of bonanzas and debt, currency, inflation, and 
banking crises.  Hence, their analysis sheds light on the first part of the question of 
whether financial crises are more likely.  
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Bonanzas and crises: preamble and evidence 
The preceding section delineated the RR criteria used to define a capital flow 
bonanza.  This section summarizes the RR results on the potential links with 
financial crises of various stripes.  Our crisis analysis is taken directly from 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  These crises definitions are reproduced in Table 1.  
 From the crises dates and the bonanza dates RR constructed a family of 
country-specific probabilities.  For each country this implies four unconditional 
crisis probabilities, that of: default (or restructuring) on external sovereign debt, a 
currency crash, an inflation crisis, and a banking crisis.  RR also construct the 
probability of each type of crisis within a window of three years before and after the 
bonanza year or years, this we refer to as the conditional probability of a crisis.  If 
capital flow bonanzas make countries more crises prone, the conditional probability, 
P(Crisisi│Bonanza) should be greater than the unconditional probability of a crisis, 
P(Crisisi), where the subscript i refers to the ith “type” of crisis (currency, etc.).   
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Table 1. Defining crises by events:  a summary 
 
Type of 
Crisis 
 
Definition and or Criteria 
 
Comments 
 
 
Banking 
crisis 
 
 
We mark a banking crisis by two types of 
events: (1) bank runs that lead to the 
closure, merging, or takeover by the public 
sector of one or more financial institutions; 
and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, 
merging, takeover, or large-scale 
government assistance of an important 
financial institution (or group of 
institutions), that marks the start of a string 
of similar outcomes for other financial 
institutions.   
This approach to dating the 
beginning of the banking 
crises is not without 
drawbacks.  It could date the 
crises too late, because the 
financial problems usually 
begin well before a bank is 
finally closed or merged; it 
could also date the crises too 
early, because the worst of 
crisis may come later.  
Unlike external debt crisis 
(see below), which have 
well-defined closure dates, it 
is often difficult or 
impossible to accurately 
pinpoint the year in which 
the crisis ended. 
External 
Debt crises  
A sovereign default is defined as the failure 
to meet a principal or interest payment on 
the due date (or within the specified grace 
period).  The episodes also include 
instances where rescheduled debt is 
ultimately extinguished in terms less 
favorable than the original obligation. 
While the time of default is 
accurately classified as a 
crisis year there are a large 
number of cases where the 
final resolution with the 
creditors (if it ever did take 
place) seems interminable.  
For this reason we also work 
with a crisis dummy that 
only picks up the first year. 
Inflation 
crisis  
An annual inflation rate 20 percent or 
higher. We also examine separately the 
incidence of more extreme cases where 
inflation exceeds 40 percent per annum. 
 
All consecutive years where 
the threshold is met or 
exceeded are counted as a 
part of the same inflation 
crisis. 
Currency 
crash 
An annual depreciation versus the US 
dollar (or the relevant anchor currency—
historically the UK pound, the French 
franc, or the German DM and presently the 
euro) of 15 percent or more. This is similar 
to the Frankel and Rose (1996) approach to 
dating crashes. 
In parallel treatment to the 
inflation crisis dating, all 
consecutive years where the 
threshold is met or exceeded 
are counted as a part of the 
same inflation crisis. 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
 
Table 3 reports a subset of the RR results, most relevant to Latin America, 
focusing on the middle and lower income groups.  
The test statistic for the equality between two proportions, 
 
 
11 
 
2/1
21
21
11)1(
)(












+−
−
=
nn
PP
ppZ , where 
21
2211
nn
npnpP
+
+
=  
 
is calculated for each pair of probabilities, where n1 = n2  = number of observations 
in each group.  The instances where the difference in proportions is significantly 
different at the one percent confidence level are reported in Table 2 in italics. 
The main results are summarized as follows.   
For the full sample, the probability of any of the four varieties of crises 
conditional on a capital flow bonanza is significantly higher than the unconditional 
probability.  Put differently, the incidence of a financial crisis is higher around a 
capital inflow bonanza.  The bottom row of Table 2 provides the share of countries 
for which P(Crisisi│Bonanza) ≥ P(Crisisi) as an additional indication of how 
commonplace is it across countries to see bonanzas associated with a more crisis-
prone environment.  For sovereign defaults, less than half the countries record an 
increase in default probabilities around capital flow bonanzas.  (Here, it is important 
to recall that about one-third of the countries in the core sample are high income.)  
For currency, banking, and inflation crises, the majority of countries register a 
higher propensity to crisis around bonanza periods. 
 Beyond the aggregate results presented in Table 2, Figures 3 and 4 for debt, 
currency, inflation, and banking crises present a comparison of conditional and 
unconditional probabilities for individual countries, where the differences in crisis 
probabilities were greatest.  (Hence, the country list varies from one figure to the 
next). While the advanced economies register much lower (conditional and 
unconditional) crisis probabilities than their lower income counterparts, the 
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likelihood of crisis is higher around bonanza episodes in several instances.  Notably, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela among others record 
a higher probability of a banking crisis during the vicinity of a capital flow bonanza, 
while Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and most of the Central American countries show a 
greater predisposition to a currency crash when bonanzas are present (Figure 3). The 
higher debt and inflation crises probabilities conditional on previous capital inflow 
bonanzas for most of the countries in the region present the same pattern.  
It is worth noting that the RR results for the advanced economies resemble 
that of emerging markets far more closely once the sample is extended to include the 
numerous crises of 2007-2013 that were preceded by capital inflow bonanzas, as 
documented in Reinhart and Reinhart (2011) and Table 3. 
Table 2. Are Bonanza Episodes More Crisis Prone? 
66 Countries, 1960-2007 
Probability of crisis External Currency Inflation Banking 
(in percent) Default Crash Crisis Crisis 
    
Middle and low  income 
Conditional on a bonanza       
(three-year window) 29.6 31.5 31.7 20.7 
Unconditional 21.0 22.7 23.5 14.3 
Difference 8.6 8.8 8.2 6.4 
All countries         
Conditional on a bonanza       
(three-year window) 22.2 25.8 24.2 18.4 
Unconditional 15.7 19.1 18.0 13.2 
Difference 6.5 6.7 6.2 5.2 
Percent of countries for which conditional probability is greater than 
unconditional 
          
  42.2 65.6 59.4 60.9 
          
          
Notes:  The three-year window encompasses three years before the bonanza years. 
Italics denote significance at the one percent confidence level.   
Sources:  Reinhart and Reinhart (2009).  
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Figure 3. Conditional and Unconditional Probability of a Banking Crisis and 
Currency Crash
 
 
Source:  Reinhart and Reinhart (2009). 
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Figure 4. Conditional and Unconditional Probability of External Default and Inflation 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Reinhart and Reinhart (2009). 
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Table 3: Capital Flow Bonanzas and Crises: Advanced Economies,2005-2013 
 
Countries with bonanzas  
during 2005-2007 
Crisis type  
(if any) 
Australia Currency crash 2009 
Finland Currency crash 2009 
Greece Banking and default/restructuring 
2008- 
Iceland Banking and private restructuring 2007-
2013 
Ireland Banking and default/restructuring 
2007- 
New Zealand Currency crash 2009- 
Portugal Banking crisis 2008- 
Spain  Banking crisis 2008- 
UK Banking crisis 2007- 
US Banking crisis 2007- 
Sources:   Reinhart and Reinhart (2011) and sources cited therein. 
 
 
IV. Fear of Floating, Inflation, and Other Risks 
 
 
The capital inflow bonanza that Latin America has experienced over these 
past years makes a number of these countries more vulnerable to a host of economic 
crises, including external defaults, currency crashes, inflation crises, and banking 
crises. Of these, we view default risk as the least likely at the regional level at 
present. Of course, Argentina is still technically in default and in Venezuela’s 
turbulent economic and political environment an external default cannot be ruled out 
despite the fact that total (public plus private) external debt to GDP as of 2011 was 
only about 22 percent.  In what follows, we focus on other vulnerabilities.   
Banking crises and hidden debts 
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Given asset price and domestic credit booms in countries like Brazil and Peru, 
for instance, banking sector problems are a more imminent source of concern. Also a 
currency crash, which usually goes hand in hand with a capital flow reversal, is 
another source of risk. While the public sector has importantly reoriented its 
borrowing toward domestic currency debt, private sector borrowing in the form of 
bond issuance has climbed dramatically in recent years. Technically, much of this 
borrowing is not classified as external (as the bonds are issued under the domestic 
jurisdiction).  In reality, the trend toward borrowing in US dollars to take advantage 
of the exceptionally low short term interest rates in the US has escalated in several 
countries in the region, notably Brazil. In recent years, the return of the phenomenon 
described in Calvo and Reinhart (2002) “fear of floating” or in this particular 
instance “fear of appreciation” (see Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007 for 
compelling documentation for the pre-crisis period) may have, once again, reduced 
incentives to hedge exchange rate exposures. The potential for currency mismatches 
this kind of activity carries poses risks to financial stability and, indeed, it is a claim 
on foreign exchange reserves should a run ensued. Nor is Latin America is not alone 
from these “shadow banking risks” (see Shin, 2011). India, China, and other 
important Asian emerging market economies have also seen these risks escalate. 
Inflation 
As noted, during a capital inflow, as demand for domestic currency increases, 
there is a tendency for the currency to appreciate. Most developing countries, 
including Latin American countries, have not been entirely content to let their 
currencies appreciate and have instead worked to stabilize the exchange rate. 
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However, as these countries attempted to stabilize their currencies, they also began 
to import the expansionary monetary policies of advanced economies. Figure 5, 
which traces from 1900-2012 the share of countries in the region where inflation 
today (time=T) is higher than inflation ten years ago (T-10) has been creeping 
steadily higher since the great push to inflation stabilization was largely completed 
by the early 2000s. While the pass-through from exchange rates to prices has 
declined in the region (in large part to the improved inflation performance and 
inflation targeting), the impact of a currency crash from a capital flow reversal could 
quickly accelerate the  trend shown in Figure 5. 
Though Figure 5 is silent about the magnitude or level of inflation, it is clear 
that there are periods during which the region as a whole tended to move towards 
higher inflation. The late 1960s and 1970s present a situation that is relevant to the 
present conjuncture. Owing to a combination of factors including the oil shocks and 
the Vietnam War, the United States began to run persistent deficits and the dollar 
came under increasing pressure. The period of relative price stability and high 
growth after World War II came to an end with the end of Bretton Woods in the 
early 1970s. Past the fall of Bretton Woods, Latin American countries continued to 
peg their currencies to the dollar and imported the United States’ very expansionary 
monetary policy at a time in which such monetary stimulus was largely incompatible 
with their domestic needs. Inflation began its upward march. 
Political and economic stability instability in much of the region in the 1970s 
and 1980s lent itself to the heavy reliance on inflationary finance, a process that 
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ultimately yielded hyperinflation in no less than five countries (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Nicaragua, and Peru) and chronically high inflation in many more. 
Since the crisis of 2007-2009, many Latin American countries have been 
aggressively intervening (in some cases essentially pegging) in the foreign exchange 
markets to avoid nominal appreciation of their currencies and as a result, are (once 
again) importing the United States’ expansionary monetary policy during this period.  
Hopefully inflation targeting framework will avoid a replay of the past but at 
present, it is too early to tell. 
 
Figure 4: Share of Countries with Higher Inflation Compared with Ten Years Before: 
Latin America, 1910-2012 
 
 
 
Sources:  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. 
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V. Concluding Observations 
 
The praise that Latin America has received for its macroeconomic 
management is at once deserved and undeserved.  Because Latin America was able 
to markedly deleverage, and in some cases, restructure its public and private debts in 
the decade preceding the Great Contraction, the region was able to emerge from a 
period of global economic turmoil relatively quickly and practically unscathed.  Low 
levels of inflation (by the historical standards of the region), a substantial war chest 
of foreign exchange reserves, and competitive currencies facilitated the adjustment 
in the face of a massive external shock from the crises in the advanced economies. 
But the benign influence of external factors in the form of low and stable 
international interest rates, high commodity prices, and spectacular growth in China 
cannot be underestimated during this period. 
While it is true that the majority Latin American countries do not face the 
imminent risk of an external default, the idea that the region has entered a new 
golden era of low vulnerabilities is not only a fallacy but bespeaks of a complacency 
not warranted by the present economic and financial fundamentals.  The risks of an 
economic slowdown accompanied by rising inflation and currency depreciation have 
been the norm following capital inflow bonanzas, as discussed here. During 
consecutive years of low international interest rates and high commodity prices, 
domestic credit booms and marked increases in real estate and other asset prices 
unfolded in several countries in a pattern that is all too reminiscent of the 
antecedents of many financial crises in both advanced and emerging market 
economies.  Public and private domestic debts have increased markedly in recent 
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years. Some of these debts are recorded and others remain hidden from view. 
Domestic bond markets have seen record private issuance.  
In line with the nearly global efforts to counteract the effects of the crisis, 
Latin American governments engaged in fiscal stimulus programs that were a priori 
supposed to be temporary. This one-step increase in government consumption was 
for the most part not reversed, as the economies quickly and sharply recovered from 
the turmoil of 2008-2009.  The all-too-familiar tendency of policymakers in the 
region to treat good shocks as permanent has, once again resurfaced.  
About twenty years ago Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) wrote about 
the fickleness of external economic conditions and the nagging credibility problems 
accompanying domestic economic reforms.  In good times vulnerabilities in the 
external and fiscal accounts are masked, but sometime after a relatively brief spell 
with countercyclical polices, fiscal procyclicality has re-emerged in varying 
degrees. 6 
It is premature and even dangerous to declare victory over macroeconomic 
instability in the region. In the advanced economies the (relatively brief) “Great 
Moderation” era was anchored in the view that the business cycle had been tamed. 
We know how well that episode ended.  Latin America remains vulnerable to the 
devastating shocks from within and from without that have defined the region’s 
economies for over two centuries. Memories of past crises should be a critical part 
of the public discussion, for in keeping those memories alive lies the hope that past 
policy mistakes are avoided or at least caught early. 
                                                 
6 See Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin (2013) for a recent examination of the old fiscal procyclicality 
question in Latin American and emerging markets more broadly. 
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